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Abstract: Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) transfer significant responsibility for infrastructure
and public service delivery to the private sector. This raises questions in relation to accountability
in the context of PPP. An important accountability mechanism is the Value for Money (VFM)
assessment which procuring authorities in Ireland must conduct prior to adoption of PPP. This
paper examines the application of VFM appraisal procedures in the case of the water services
sector. As the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government, considers PPP as the
preferred model of procurement, VFM assessments fail to deliver an acceptable level of
accountability. The result is a mono-culture of PPP procurement in the water services sector.
I INTRODUCTION
It is now over ten years since a systematic programme of public privatepartnerships (PPP) was announced in Ireland. Despite the initial
pronouncements that PPP would be adopted on a pragmatic basis the model
has proved extremely attractive to Irish policymakers and the PPP model is
regularly put forward as a means of procuring infrastructure projects when
they come under consideration. The attraction of the model was such that
although PPPs were initially introduced on a pilot basis in 1999 (with eight
projects nominated across five sectors including roads, schools and waste
management) the proposed programme expanded even before the pilot
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projects reached the early stages of the procurement process. The National
Development Plan 2000-2006 which was published in November 1999 justified
this expansion on the basis of the acute nature of Ireland’s deficit of physical
infrastructure. Today the PPP model is being used to procure a range of
projects such as national motorways, Dublin’s first metro line, urban
regeneration initiatives, court service facilities and water services projects.
The scale of overall PPP activity in Ireland has been such that, in a recent
review of international PPP activity, Ireland was ranked third (after the UK
and Australia) in terms of the maturity of its PPP markets (Deloitte, 2007).
The apparent faith of Irish policymakers in PPP model was not necessarily
justified in terms of the international experience. For example, the UK version
of PPP, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) which was launched in 1992, had
been the subject of much criticism in the literature on PPP/PFI. One of the
principal criticisms of PPP/PFI policy in the UK was that the model was being
imposed on decision makers (for example, managers in local authorities) as
the only available option. In other words, PPP/PFI was the “only game in
town”. The Commission on PPPs which published its comprehensive report on
the UK experience with PPP/PFI in 2001 was particularly critical in this
respect. 
PPPs are sometimes ‘the only game in town’. Much of the antagonism towards
PPPs is the result of widespread and at times justified suspicion that PPPs are
still being used simply to get public investment ‘off-balance sheet’. Worse still,
the desire to press ahead with PPPs for these reasons has sometimes led to
short cuts being taken in relation to accountability and value for money
procedures (2001, p. 19).
This paper provides evidence of a similar approach to PPP policy in the
case of Ireland. Focusing on the water services sector it examines value for
money (VFM) procedures used as the basis for the adoption of PPP. It draws
attention to the fact that the sponsoring government department (the
Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DoEHLG))
explicitly refers to the Design, Build, Operate (DBO) model of PPP as the
“preferred model of procurement” in the water services sector in Ireland.
Although official guidelines on the assessment of PPP projects require that the
potential for VFM must be demonstrated before PPP is adopted this paper
presents evidence from individual water service projects which demonstrate
how VFM assessments are used (or misused) in order to arrive at
recommendations in favour of PPP. The case study evidence demonstrates
clearly that PPP is indeed the “only game in town” in the Irish water services
sector.
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II THE GLOBAL POPULARITY OF PPP
Cooperation between the public and private sectors is nothing new but in
recent years the label PPP has been commonly applied to a host of different
forms of cooperation. Hodge and Greve (2007, 2009) illustrate this point by
describing five different “families of such partnerships” (2009, p. 33). These
include institutional cooperation for joint production and risk sharing (such as
the Netherlands Port Authority) and urban renewal and downtown
development (such as in the USA where a range of local economic development
and urban renewal measures are pursued). PPPs for infrastructure such as
water and wastewater plants represent another form of PPP. Vining et al.
(2005) assert that such partnerships are typically characterised by a written
contract between the government and one or more private sector organisations
where the private sector agrees to design, build, operate and in some cases
finance a facility for a specified period of time. Such agreements are also
characterised by durability as well as “… some degree of joint decision making
and financial risk sharing” (2005, p. 200). A range of different acronyms have
been adopted to describe such PPPs. These include DBO (Design, Build,
Operate), DBFO (Design, Build, Finance and Operate) and concession PPPs
with the precise label applied depending on the exact roles and distribution of
risks between the public and private sectors. 
Infrastructure PPPs, which command the focus of this article, have
become increasingly prevalent over the last two decades as governments
around the world grapple with the challenge of providing much needed
infrastructure without threatening fiscal sustainability. In Europe alone,
Blanc-Brude et al. (2007) report that in the last 15 years over a thousand PPP
contracts have been signed with a capital value of approximately €200 billion.
The same authors report that the UK has been the undoubted leader in terms
of PPP activity accounting for three-quarters of the number of PPP projects in
Europe and 58 per cent of the total value. Elsewhere, PPPs have taken a hold
in the USA, Canada, Australia and South Africa, particularly since the mid-
1990s while the model is also gaining popularity in emerging and developing
economies.
III PPP OBJECTIVES, VALUE FOR MONEY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Governments adopting PPP tend to offer similar justifications for adopting
this model rather than more direct forms of public provision. One of the key
justifications for PPPs is that they serve to control public expenditure. Under
appropriate conditions (in relation to risk transfer) PPP investments do not
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count towards public borrowing thereby providing off-balance sheet financing.
Second, where PPPs are structured on the basis of the private finance,
governments can avoid up-front capital costs. Spreading these costs over a
longer period can assist in meeting fiscal targets. A third rationale for PPP is
that they provide a model for providing infrastructure and services at lower
cost (VFM) resulting primarily from superior private sector scale efficiencies
and technical efficiency (Vining et al., 2005). A key driver of VFM is the scope
for risk transfer under PPP. This scope for risk transfer provides a fourth
argument in favour of PPP. If risks are appropriately allocated between public
and private contractors, this provides an alignment of incentives that
encourages greater efficiency. A fifth justification for PPPs is that they provide
scope for better innovation and accrual of dynamic efficiencies as bids are
tendered on the basis of an output specification instead of detailed input
specifications that characterise traditional procurement.
Whether PPPs succeed or fail in the achievement of these objectives is
open to question. Evaluations of PPP outcomes have only started to emerge in
recent years. These tend to focus on the question of VFM and while the
findings tend to be mixed, the quality of evaluations is undermined by the fact
that most PPP contracts are at early stages and there are no published studies
based on statistical analysis of a reliable sample of PPP projects. 
Accountability is an important issue in the PPP debate. As PPPs are
institutions “… exercising public powers, using public resources and providing
public services, they need to be accountable to those on whose behalf they act”
(Jones and Stewart, 2009, p. 59). Accountability is therefore required if PPP is
to serve as a legitimate tool of governance but the international experience
with PPP suggests that PPPs are characterised by shortcomings in relation to
expectations in this regard. In their review of the international experience
with PPP, Hodge and Greve (2007) note that: 
PPPs also seem to have provided only limited levels of transparency or public
participation. With limited transparency and complex adjustment formulae in
PPPs, the clarity of partnership arrangements can also be difficult to fathom.
This does not give citizens confidence in the arrangements, when despite the
rhetoric of risk sharing with private financing, a significant financial role for
the government is often the reality (2007, p. 552).
One of the key mechanisms of accountability under PPP is the VFM
assessment process. Ball et al. (2007) define VFM in the context of the PFI as 
… related to the idea that the PFI scheme can produce a flow of services of at
least equivalent quality to that which could be provided by the public sector,
but at a lower overall cost (taking into account, particularly the allocation of
risk).
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A quantitative assessment of VFM generally involves a comparison of the
cost of the PPP with a hypothetical scenario that estimates the net present
value (NPV) of the expected lifecycle costs if the project were to be pursued by
traditional procurement (Morallos and Amkudzi, 2009). This hypothetical
scenario which is generally referred to as the public sector comparator (PSC)
has been the subject of some critique in the PPP literature. A full discussion of
such issues is beyond the scope of this paper but specific concerns in this
regard include the possibility of errors in estimating cost and revenue flows
and associated probabilities. In addition, the identification and quantification
of risks is an inexact exercise and there is evidence to suggest that this
element of the VFM exercise can be used to swing decisions in favour of
preferred outcomes (Ball et al., 2001). It has been argued that the PSC
concentrates on aspects that can be easily quantified and expressed in
monetary terms and that insufficient attention is paid to issues such as service
quality (Kintoye et al., 2002). Moreover, the importance of transaction costs in
the context of PPP procurement has been highlighted by a number of writers
(Lonsdale, 2005, Reeves, 2008) and this aspect is rarely given adequate
attention in VFM assessments. The Commission on PPPs in the UK (2001) has
drawn attention to the questions of transparency and accountability in
relation to VFM assessments. They recommend that at the very least a PSC
should be constructed and that the PSC should be discussed regularly
throughout the negotiation process and should be fully disclosed at the
appropriate time. VFM decisions can therefore be “… assumed to be a function
of accountability. More and better accountability is therefore expected to yield
improved VFM decisions (assuming resources input (sic) remains the same) in
PFI” (Demirag et al., 2004, p. 15). The remainder of this paper focuses on the
PPP experience in Ireland. It describes the guidelines for assessing potential
PPP projects for VFM and examines the practice of VFM assessment in the
water services sector.
IV PPP ACTIVITY IN IRELAND
Ireland has followed the global trend towards PPPs for the provision of
infrastructure and asset-backed services. Table 1 shows that in May 2009
there were roughly 150 PPP projects at different stages of the procurement
and project life-cycle. Attaching reliable values to these PPP projects is not
possible before contracts are awarded. Some indication of the value of PPP
projects can however be gauged from the last two national development plans,
which covered the period 2000-2013, and included provisions of €14.8 billion
in private finance under PPP. 
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Table 1 also shows that PPP is being adopted in areas such as road and
rail transport, waste management (including incineration), education (school
and university buildings), health (a national radiotherapy network), social and
affordable housing and courts facilities. While the scale of PPP investment
appears ambitious it can be noted that progress to date has been slow with just
six projects outside the water and wastewater sector at the stage where assets
are in operation. 
Table 1: Estimate of the Number of PPP Projects in Ireland in May 2009
Pre-Tender Procurement Construction Operation Total
Roads 0 1 6 3 10
Rail 3 1 0 0 4
Waste Management 1 1 0 0 2
Courts 1 0 1 0 2
Education 3 0 1 3 7
Health 1 0 0 0 1
Arts 1 1 1 0 3
Government 2 0 0 0 2
Prisons 2 0 0 0 2
Housing 3 5 1 0 9
Harbour Re-Development 1 0 1 0 2
Water/Wastewater 26 34 16 30 106
Total 44 43 27 36 150
Notes: (1) Data derived from the PPP website housed by the Department of Finance in
conjunction with available data of water and wastewater projects from the DoEHLG.
(2) Data for water and wastewater is for June 2007. (3) Pre-tender projects are at
various stages of the appraisal procedures for investment under PPP. 
V PPP AND VFM ASSESSMENT IN IRELAND
In Ireland, the rollout of the PPP programme has been accompanied by the
development of a detailed institutional architecture designed to support its
implementation. This architecture includes a number of organisational
features (e.g., the establishment of PPP units within government
departments), as well as the publication of a number of official guidelines for
the provision of infrastructure and capital investments through PPP (e.g.,
procedures for the assessment, approval, audit and procurement of projects as
well as guidelines on stakeholder consultation). According to its website, the
Central PPP Policy Unit at the Department of Finance is the central point of
access to the PPP process in Ireland. The key function of this unit is to develop
the legislative framework, technical and policy guidance to support the PPP
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process and to disseminate best practice in PPPs. In its main guidelines for
procurement under PPP the Department of Finance places much emphasis on
VFM.
[A]n overarching consideration in the procurement and delivery of every
public investment project is the achievement of value for money (2006a, p. 13). 
The steps in the procurement process for PPP projects are illustrated in
Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Traditional and PPP Procurement Stages – Summary
The most recent guidelines in relation to VFM assessment, issued in
October 2007, describe four separate VFM tests which take place at the
following stages:
1. VFM Test 1: takes place at the detailed appraisal stage which applies to
all capital projects that fall within the capital appraisal guidelines. When
a project is under consideration for procurement under PPP the detailed
appraisal includes a PPP Procurement Assessment (discussed below).
2. VFM Test 2: involves compilation of a detailed public sector benchmark1
(PSB) prior to commencement of the procurement process.
3. VFM Test 3: takes place when the PSB is compared to private sector bids
as part of the tender evaluation process.
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4. VFM Test 4: takes place when the PSB is compared to the final bid after
negotiations with the preferred bidder are complete and before awarding
the contract.
Assessing PPP projects for VFM is therefore a central element of the PPP
procurement process and constitutes what is arguably the key accountability
mechanism under PPP. Evidence in relation to the practice of VFM assess -
ment is however scarce. The following sections seek to illuminate this issue by
examining the practice of VFM assessment in the Irish water services sector. 
VI PPP IN THE IRISH WATER SERVICES SECTOR
Table 1 shows that the water services sector accounts for a significant
majority of PPP projects in Ireland. This can be attributed to two factors. First,
high levels of investment have been directed to the water services sector since
the early 1990s due to the legacy of historically low levels of investment; rapid
growth in the demand for water services due to inter alia very strong
demographic and economic growth; increased tourism numbers; record levels
of new residential growth and the requirement to meet environmental
standards set out in EU directives. The DoEHLG oversees the provision of
water services and is currently responsible for the Water Services Investment
Programme which is a three year rolling plan for the provision of major water
and sewerage schemes.2 The scale of planned state investment in water
services since 1994 is provided in Table 2.
Table 2: Provision for Investment in Water Services, 1994-2016
Period Planned Investment
(€ billion)  
1994-1999 €1.22
2000-2006 €2.495
2007-2013 €4.75
2010-2016 €3.468
Note: Time periods covered by the last three national development plans (NDPs).
Planned investment for the period 2007-2013 was revised in July 2010. The re-
prioritised spending envelope covers the period 2010-2016.
102 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
2 The largest component of the Programme relates to the provision of water and sewerage schemes
with a view to complying with both the EU Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive and the
Drinking Water Directive. The other main component is rural water services and group schemes.
05 Reeves PP article_ESRI Vol 42-1  13/04/2011  09:33  Page 102
Second, the relatively high incidence of PPP projects in the water services
sector can be attributed to the DoEHLG’s stated policy of considering PPP as
the preferred method of procurement for water and wastewater treatment
works. According to the DoEHLG, PPPs in the water services sector can
… offer value for money through the use of more technically innovative and
lower cost solutions and greater efficiency and cost effectiveness in the
operation of works … the Department informed local authorities in January
1999 that the Department’s policy will be to favour the DB/DBO approach for
projects involving the provision or upgrading of major water or waste water
treatment works, unless there are strong reasons against it (DoEHLG, 1999,
p. 19). 
This stated preference for the PPP model is clearly at odds with the
guidelines on VFM and PPP Procurement summarised in Figure 1. These
guidelines are based on testing for VFM at four different stages of the
procurement process and VFM must be demonstrated before procurement
under PPP proceeds. There is a clear conflict between a declared preference for
PPP and the requirement for an objective VFM test. This following section
presents three case-studies of the practice of VFM assessment in this context. 
VII THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN – CASE STUDIES OF 
VFM ASSESSMENT IN IRISH WATER SERVICES SECTOR
The analysis in the cases presented in this section is based on the details
of the VFM assessment reports which are a critical component of the wider
PPP Procurement Assessment conducted at the early stages of the procure -
ment process (see Figure 1).3,4 To assess VFM, local authorities are required
to compare the hypothetical cost of procuring the project under traditional
procurement referred to as the Public Sector Benchmark (PSB)) with the
hypothetical costs under different forms of PPP (normally DB and DBO).5
Both estimates are based on calculation of capital costs, operating and
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just before the call for tenders. The cases examined in this paper conducted their assessment on
the basis of the earlier guidance.
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maintenance costs over the life of the project and an adjustment based on the
allocation of risk. In cases where this assessment indicates that PPP is likely
to achieve VFM the project can be expected to proceed as a PPP. In such cases
the PPP guidelines issued by the Department of Finance apply. 
Case Study 1 – Tell Them What They Want To Hear!
The local authority covered in this case is procuring two separate works: a
water abstraction and treatment plant and a water and wastewater treatment
works. Both plants have whole-life costs of approximately €20 million. The
local authority commissioned separate PPP Assessment Reports from private
consulting engineers which were completed in December 2007. In both cases,
the PPP Assessment Reports were prepared in accordance with guidelines
issued by the DoEHLG and the Department of Finance. The principal
guidelines used in the preparation of PPP Assessment Reports were those
issued by the DoEHLG in 2003 (see footnote 5). 
The principal findings from the VFM assessments of both projects are
presented in Table 3. It shows that the whole life costs for the water treatment
plant (plant 1) were estimated to be 5.3 per cent lower under DBO than costs
under traditional procurement. In the case of the water and wastewater
treatment plant (plant 2) it was estimated that whole life costs under
traditional procurement would be 2.4 per cent lower than costs under the DBO
option. 
Table 3: Summary of VFM Assessment Findings (DBO Versus Traditional
Procurement) for Two Water Service Projects – Case Study 1
Plant 1 – Plant 2 –
Water Treatment Water and Wastewater 
Works Treatment Works
Capital Cost No difference No difference
Operating & Maintenance Costs 1.6% lower under DBO 26% lower under
traditional
Risks Retained by Public Sector 87.5% lower under DBO 73% lower under DBO
Overall Saving 5.3% lower under DBO 2.4% lower under 
traditional
Note: Risks retained by the public sector are estimated under both procurement
options. As the DBO option seeks to transfer risk to the private sector it can be
expected that risks retained by the public sector will be lower under DBO. 
A host of questions arise with regard to the derivation of these estimates.
For example, as risk retained by the public sector is significantly lower under
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DBO for both plants, it is noteworthy that these estimates were not subjected
to sensitivity analysis. Notwithstanding such issues, the focus of this paper
concerns the use (or misuse) of the VFM Assessment Report in terms of
deciding on the procurement model.
In the case of the water treatment works (Plant 1) the VFM Assessment
Report states that:
… the accuracy of the Value for Money Assessment is not sufficient to
determine that traditional procurement is unsuitable in this instance.
However the report makes the following final recommendation:
… the assessment of the procurement options has indicated that DBO is
suitable….However the assessment is not conclusive that DBO should be the
preferred method. DBO is the preferred methodology for Water Services
projects of this type. Consequently, in the absence of any conclusive evidence
indicating that traditional procurement offers distinct advantages, the
selected procurement method should be DBO.
In relation to the water and wastewater plant (Plant 2) it was estimated
that traditional procurement would yield VFM compared to DBO. However,
the VFM Assessment Report recommended the following:
The assessment showed that in terms of the overall cost of the scheme
Traditional Procurement is marginally more economically advantageous....
However given the difference of only 2.4% in the figures and the fact that the
figures in the estimate could only be considered to be accurate within 10% we
consider that the exercise could not be considered to demonstrate that
traditional procurement would be the most economical design. We have
concluded therefore that even though the figures show Traditional
Procurement to be the cheaper option …(the) council should proceed on the
basis of DBO procurement which was the recommendation in the Preliminary
Report and is in line with the policy of the DoEHLG that water and
wastewater treatment plants of this nature are procured by Design Build
Operate Contracts. 
The recommendations in both reports demonstrate clearly that the local
authority and the consulting engineers that were commissioned to prepare
PPP Assessment Reports were guided by the DoEHLG’s official preference for
the DBO model of procurement and that the objectivity of the reports have
been compromised. Whether the DoEHLG accept the recommendations in
both reports remains to be seen but the evidence presented in the following
cases suggests that this is likely.
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Case Study 2: You Can Have Any Procurement Model As Long As IT’s DBO!
The local authority in this case is seeking to replace a wastewater
treatment plant that will double the capacity of the existing plant and serve a
population of approximately 5,000. The expected whole life cost of the plant is
approximately €7 million. The first step in the project appraisal was the
completion of the Preliminary Report. This was completed in April 2002.
Whereas this report mainly covers engineering issues it does include a short
qualitative section which examines the applicability of the DB/DBO models of
procurement. The assessment concluded that the benefits accruing to a
DB/DBO model apply to medium or large scale treatment plants or a group of
smaller treatment plants in the same region. As this did not apply in this case
it was recommended that the scheme be implemented using the traditional
approach which would allow the new works to be completed within the
shortest possible period.
The local authority sought approval for the Preliminary Report and its
recommendation (in favour of traditional procurement) from the DoEHLG.
This request resulted in a protracted dialogue between both parties with 
the result that the facility remains undelivered.  Initially the DoEHLG
requested that the local authority examine the option of bundling a number of
plants into one possible DBO scheme. This local authority responded to 
this request by outlining the severe inadequacy of the existing plant and
pressures arising due to a growing population. Over the following months it
advanced other arguments against the adoption of the PPP model. These
included: 
● the introduction of DBO contracts will lead to duplication of resources and
subsequent increased operational costs.
● the question of the local authority being contractually tied for 20 years
without committed financial resources in place;
● industrial relations implications (e.g. redundancies and/or re-deployment);
● interface problems between the contractor and the local authority (which
will continue to hold responsibility for maintenance of networks and water
treatment plants).
These concerns were rejected by the DoEHLG which re-iterated its
preference for the DBO model and that the funding of such schemes is
conditional on compliance with policy in favour of DBO. Almost two years after
the completion of the Preliminary Report the local authority acquiesced and
agreed to proceed with the contract in the form of a DBO.
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A number of issues arise in relation to this case. First, it appears that the
DoEHLG was willing to dismiss local concerns in favour of the ‘preferred’ DBO
model. This has resulted in considerable delay in procuring the much needed
plant. In this case tenders were submitted over six years after the completion
of the Preliminary Report. In addition, it is worth noting that the local
authority was given permission to proceed with procurement using the DBO
model on the basis of the initial Preliminary Report. Notwithstanding the fact
that this report recommended traditional procurement, the DoEHLG did not
insist on the completion of a PPP Assessment in accordance with government
guidelines (see Stage 2 in Figure 1).
Case 3 – If At First You Don’t Succeed (In Demonstrating VFM) Try, Try
Again!
In this case a large urban local authority is seeking to procure the
replacement of the city’s only water treatment plant with a new plant with a
significantly higher capacity. The whole life cost of the new plant is expected
to be in the region of €80 million (in net present value terms).
The circumstances surrounding the preparation of the PPP Assessment
Report differed significantly from those that prevailed in the other two cases
covered in this paper. In this case the local authority agreed to detailed
consultation regarding the content of the report with existing employees. This
consultation consisted of a series of round-table meetings between the
consulting engineers who prepared the report, management and engineering
staff in the local authority, existing employees in the water treatment plant,
trade union officials and advisors. The starting point for consultation was the
first draft of the report completed by the consultant engineers. The round-
table meetings provided the opportunity for all stakeholders to raise questions
about the content of the report and to make necessary changes on the basis of
consensus. 
The rationale for this form of consultation can be traced back to one of the
official guidelines on PPP issued by the Department of Finance. The central
guideline “Public Private Partnership – Stakeholder Consultation for
Employees and their Representatives” was issued in January 2005. The
content of this guideline was interpreted by the local authority and trade
unions as allowing for detailed consultation regarding the content of the
Procurement Assessment Report.
Table 4 provides a summary of the VFM Assessment contained in the
Procurement Assessment Report. Prior to consultation it was estimated that
the DBO model would yield VFM amounting to 9.5 per cent of traditional
procurement costs. However, a detailed scrutiny of all costs during the
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consultation process led to changes in the estimates and a reduction in the
estimated savings to less than 1 per cent The report concluded that 
… there is little if any financial advantage available for the DBO option,
especially in terms of value for money. For this reason it is recommended that
the project is instead procured by the traditional route.
Table 4: Summary of VFM Assessment Findings (DBO Versus Traditional
Procurement) Before and After Stakeholder Consultation – Case Study 3
Before Stake- After Stake-
Holder Consultation Holder Consultation
Capital Cost 10.24% lower 10.24% lower 
under-DBO under-DBO
O&M Cost 7.8% lower 0.9% lower under 
under-DBO traditional
Risks Retained by Public Sector 39.6% lower 25.6% lower 
under-DBO under traditional
Overall Value for Money 9.5% lower 0.8% lower 
under-DBO under-DBO
The report was submitted to the DoEHLG in January 2008. In June 2008
the DoEHLG responded with a list of 24 issues for the local authority to
review. It is striking that the list is overwhelmingly negative in relation to
traditional procurement. All 24 issues point to asserted weaknesses with the
traditional model of procurement. Potential risks or problems with DBO are
not considered. 
Two examples of these issues illustrate this point. First, the DoEHLG
makes the point that under DBO the operator is obliged to maintain
equipment and ensure that it is “fit for purpose”. Under traditional
procurement the standard set for design is “reasonable skill and diligence”. It
is asserted that this is an advantage under DBO. However, it is important to
remember that the DBO operator must be paid for ensuring that the facilities
are “fit for purpose”. If provisions are to be made to pay the DBO contractor
for maintenance of equipment a question that arises is whether the same
provisions can be made if the local authority is responsible for maintenance
under traditional procurement. The argument that the local authority must
pay the contractor under DBO but is unlikely to finance in-house maintenance
is difficult to sustain.
A second issue raised by the DoEHLG is that the DBO contractually
provides for necessary upgrading and renewal of equipment (using a
Maintenance Reserve Fund or Capital Replacement Fund) whereas tradi -
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tional procurement does not provide equivalent guarantees. The DoEHLG
fails to explain why capital replacement funds under traditional procurement
cannot be robust. If the DBO operator sets funds aside for capital replacement
and maintenance the local authority will be contractually obliged to pay for
this. If local authorities are permitted to make such financial commitments
under DBO, can such commitments be permitted under traditional
procurement?
VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS
Governments world wide are under pressure to address deficits of physical
infrastructure. Given the constraints in relation to funding such projects as
well as the urgency of infrastructural investment it is not surprising that
governments are turning to private sector participation as one means of
addressing the problem. The adoption of the PPP model, however, results in a
significant re-drawing of the boundaries between the public and private
sectors. In the case of Ireland the use of PPP has resulted in private sector
involvement in sectors that have previously been the exclusive preserve of the
public sector. Many of these sectors are important in terms of determining the
overall welfare of society (e.g. education, health, prisons, transport and
environmental services such as water treatment and provision). Such changes
pose significant challenges for accountability. 
The Commission on PPPs in the UK asserts that:
Public accountability is a pre-condition for the legitimate use of public
authority. It is the basis on which citizens are willing to delegate power to
others to act on their behalf. It underpins government based on consent.
Without proper accountability mechanisms organisations delivering services
are not subject to democratic oversight and control, the rights of citizens are
uncertain and services are unlikely to reflect the needs of service users.
Accountability is therefore an end as well as means. (2001, p. 231.)
The challenge of accountability is greater under organisational forms 
such as PPP. In the Irish case policymakers have sought to ensure
accountability under PPP through a combination of market-oriented
mechanisms such as contracts and competition and public sector instruments
such as rules of transparency and public control that apply to the public sector
(Flyvberg et al., 2003). Serious concerns have however been expressed about
the quality of accountability mechanisms in place. For example, in 2007, the
Public Accounts Committee of Dail Eireann (Irish Parliament) expressed the
view that:
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The PAC in recent years has held several plenary sessions relating to
significant PPP projects. These meetings of the committee were informed by
particular chapters of the annual reports of the Comptroller and Auditor
General, as well as a number of Value For Money reports that also emanated
from his office …. While the circumstances applying to each of these projects
vary widely, and the history of each differs, some common threads have
appeared. The largest common factor has been the frustration expressed at the
Committee of either not having appropriate access to information relating to
these projects, or being publicly unable to refer to information deemed to be
commercially sensitive. This committee believes that this obstacle needs to be
overcome. Public accountability and value for money are very important
issues. (2007, pp. 7-8.)
The evidence presented in this paper adds weight to the argument that the
Irish PPP programme is failing to meet the challenge of accountability. While
a detailed set of guidelines exists in relation to the fundamental requirement
to test PPP projects for VFM the cases from the water services sector
examined in this paper demonstrate that the mere existence of guidelines
provides no guarantees. The DoEHLG’s explicit consideration of PPP as the
preferred procurement method in the Irish water services sector has in some
cases led local authorities to reject its own VFM assessments or preliminary
reports where they were found to favour traditional procurement methods.
The evidence presented indicates that some local authority decision makers
see no point in submitting such reports. As a consequence, PPP projects are
not receiving the degree of scrutiny required in the official guidelines and the
PPP model is indeed the only game in town in the water services sector.
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